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Abstract—With the rapid technological advancements, orga-
nizations need to rapidly scale up their information technology
(IT) infrastructure viz. hardware, software, and services, at a low
cost. However, the dynamic growth in the network services and
applications creates security vulnerabilities and new risks that
can be exploited by various attacks. For example, User to Root
(U2R) and Remote to Local (R2L) attack categories can cause a
significant damage and paralyze the entire network system. Such
attacks are not easy to detect due to the high degree of similarity
to normal traffic. While network anomaly detection systems are
being widely used to classify and detect malicious traffic, there
are many challenges to discover and identify the minority attacks
in imbalanced datasets. In this paper, we provide a detailed
and systematic analysis of the existing Machine Learning (ML)
approaches that can tackle most of these attacks. Furthermore,
we propose a Deep Learning (DL) based framework using Long
Short Term Memory (LSTM) autoencoder that can accurately
detect malicious traffics in network traffic. We perform our
experiments in a publicly available dataset of Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDSs). We obtain a significant improvement in attack
detection, as compared to other benchmarking methods. Hence,
our method provides great confidence in securing these networks
from malicious traffic.
Index Terms—Security countermeasures, Attack detection,
Machine learning approach, LSTM, NSLKDD, Malicious traffic,
Detection rate
I. INTRODUCTION
Intrusion is the main problem of security breaches, where
a malicious user can damage or steal vital information of the
network system in a short time. Moreover, it can cause further
financial losses and huge damages in IT critical infrastructure.
For example, $350M and $70M are the size of loss caused
by Yahoo and Bitcoin data breach, respectively [1]. The
intruder techniques have been evolved using sophisticated
tools to create attacks, exploiting vulnerabilities in server
protocols [2], [3].
Primarily, the four popular attack classes that can cause
extensive damage to any network environment include:
• Probe: It is not considered an attack by itself, but it is
a primary step for any attacker to get more information
about any network vulnerabilities that will allow for a
future attack.
• R2L: The R2L attack involves the attacker to access the
victim machine using some vulnerabilities from the prob-
ing phase to get illegal access or local right permissions.
• U2R: In this type of attack, the attacker attempts to get
full privilege in the victim machine, who has only local
access on it.
• Denial-of-Service (DoS): Finally, in this type, the at-
tacker attempts to overwhelm or flood the target machine
or network, with a view to disturb its normal operation.
The traditional defense techniques, i.e. firewall, fail to detect
intrusion attacks inside the network system due to its nature
and its specific features [4]. Recently, several ML models [5]–
[9] have been developed to provide a framework for detecting
anomalies in network traffic data. These frameworks are
evaluated and benchmarked against standard datasets that are
publicly available. The KDDCUP’99 [10] and its modified
version NSL-KDD dataset [11] are the most widely used
datasets in anomaly detection application domain. The NSL-
KDD1 dataset is a modified version of KDDCUP’99 dataset,
attempting to improve the inherent demerits of the original
dataset.
The current state-of-the-art algorithms provide a rigorous
framework for malicious traffic detection in the NSL-KDD
dataset. However, these methods suffer from several draw-
backs. Firstly, their performance is good only in the training
set of the dataset, while the performance in the corresponding
testing set is poor. Secondly, the detection accuracy of these
ML-based methods for certain types of attack viz. U2R, and
R2L is lower than other traffic types. This is returned to
the unbalanced nature of the dataset – the number of U2R
and R2L observations in the dataset are much lower than
other traffic types. We identify these gaps in the literature
and address them in this paper by proposing a Deep Neural
Network (DNN) for efficient detecting network attacks. The
proposed model has been developed by integrating the LSTM
layers with autoencoder to model the normal trafc data.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows – (a)
we review the related methods based on ML and discuss their
limitations; (b) we propose a DL based model for encoding the
input feature space with a high discriminatory nature and pro-
pose an approach based on LSTM to detect malicious traffic
in the network; and (c) we benchmark several state-of-the-art
ML models for detecting attacks in the publicly available NSL
-KDD dataset. Our proposed method for detecting network
attacks has the best performance in the existing benchmark
dataset.
1The NSL-KDD is available for download here: https://www.unb.ca/cic/
datasets/nsl.html.
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The structure of the remaining part of the paper is as
follows: Section II provides a systematic review of the various
learning models for detecting attacks in large-scale networks.
We propose our DL model for encoding the input feature
space and the binary classification framework in Section III.
Section IV presents our benchmarking results in the publicly
available NSL-KDD dataset. Finally, Section V concludes the
paper and discusses our future work.
II. DETECTING ATTACKS IN LARGE-SCALE NETWORKS
In this section, we provide a detailed discussion of the
various ML and DL models that have been proposed for
detecting sophisticated attacks in large-scale network environ-
ments. With the advent of DL based models, the accuracy
in detecting attacks has further improved. The DL based
methods are useful, because the discriminative features are
automatically generated, without the use of generating hand-
crafted features.
A. Related Work
In this section, we discuss some related works on anomaly
detection systems on the NSL-KDD dataset.
Dhaliwal in [12] introduced an intrusion detection module
based on XGBoost algorithm to detect malicious activities
within the network environment. The calculated accuracy of
the classifier model is 98.40% and F1-Score of 98.76%.
However, the authors combined both training and testing files
of the NSL-KDD dataset to create heterogeneous data that
contains the same attack distribution. Ever et al. in [13] pre-
sented intrusion classification model using NSL-KDD dataset.
The authors employed three different ML algorithms; Deci-
sion Tree (DT), Support Vector Machine (SVM), and back-
propagation neural network. Two different experiments are
repeated for each deployed technique. In the first experiment,
60% of the dataset is used for training, and the rest of 40%
is used for testing. While in the second experiment, 70% of
instances are used for the training set and 30% for testing.
The results show that the high accuracy is achieved from
DT model with percentages of 99.84% and 99.81% for each
experiment, respectively. However, the authors evaluated their
models using the NSL-KDD training file only without looking
at the separated testing portion of the dataset.
Alshamrani et al. in [14], proposed a defense system to
mitigate DDoS attack inside the Software Defined Network
(SDN). The represented module is evaluated using three
different ML algorithms Nave Bayes (NB), J48, and SVM on
the NSL-KDD dataset. The authors satisfied high efficiency
using SVM with an approximate accuracy of 99%. Using a
separated portion of the testing data for the model evaluation
gives poor accuracy results as the new attack records in the
testing file are different from those used for the training. Ingre
et al. [15] implemented an intrusion detection system based
on DT classifier against cyberattacks using NSL-KDD. They
applied a random sampling technique to address the problem
of minor classes of R2L and U2R in the NSL-KDD dataset.
However, the overall accuracy for the five-class classification
is 83.7%, where the detection rate for R2l and U2R is 39.9%
and 8.5%, respectively.
Latah et al. [16] proposed a five-stage hybrid classifier
system to enhance the detection rate against malicious traf-
fics inside the network. The model combines three different
ML classifiers, including the K-Nearest Neighbor approach
(KNN), Extreme Learning Machine (ELM), and Hierarchical
Extreme Learning Machine (H-ELM). The authors used five
classification layers where only one specific attack can be
detected at each layer. Therefore the experiment is executed
five times to detect normal and all attack categories. The over-
all accuracy of the presented approach is 84.29%, while the
percentage of precision, recall, and F1-score is 94.18, 77.18,
and 84.83, respectively. Prasath et al. [17] proposed a Novel
Agent Program (NAP) framework to secure a communication
model of the virtual switches in the network. The meta-
heuristic Bayesian network classification (MHBNC) approach
is used to classify the incoming packets into normal or attack
traffic. The proposed MHBNC model has achieved an overall
accuracy of 82.99%. Besides, the realized precision, recall,
and f-score is 77%, 74%, and 75%, respectively.
Wang et al. [18] proposed a detection scheme to detect the
control saturation attack in the e-health monitoring system.
The authors implemented a contrastive pessimistic likelihood
estimation (CPLE) mechanism in semi-supervised learning
using the NSL-KDD dataset. The model satisfied high effi-
ciency when 500 labeled, and 120000 unlabeled samples are
used for the benchmark dataset. The overall accuracy of the
presented method is 80.93%. In [19], the authors presented
a flow-based detection approach using Self Organizing Maps
(SOMs) classifier in the network environment. The evaluated
accuracy of the proposed model in the testing phase is 74.67%.
For overall evaluation, the precision, recall, and f-measure
obtained from the conducted model are 83%, 76%, and 75%,
respectively.
B. Limitations in the current ML-based methods
ML techniques have been widely deployed in intrusion
detection systems to recognize attack threats [20]–[23]. How-
ever, most of these works attempt to learn the feature rep-
resentation in network traffic data for effective classification.
However, it is not easy to manually handcraft and extracts
the discriminatory features in intrusion detection systems.
Firstly, the nature of the attacks evolve every day, and the
attacker’s techniques change with time. Secondly, the features
which are extracted for one category of attack, may not
necessarily be suitable for other attack classes. As a result,
selecting the significant features to identify the attack from
network traffic is a cumbersome task. Therefore, existing
attack detection techniques fail to discover all types of attacks.
In addition, there is a high degree of non-linearity in the
dataset, and therefore the traditional ML-based methods fail
to classify the normal and malicious data types [24]. Elsayed
et al. further established this fact in [24] by generating the
Andrews curve for the NSL-KDD dataset. The Andrews curve
represents a high-dimensional feature space in the form of
a finite Fourier series. This provides a visual understanding
of the internal structure of the dataset. Figure 1 shows the
Andrews curve for the NSL-KDD dataset. Each curve in Fig. 1
represents an observation in the dataset. We observe that the
two labels are not clearly grouped in two separate streams.
The legitimate and malicious data curves are tangled with
each other, indicating a high degree of inherent non-linearity
in the feature space. Therefore, traditional ML techniques fail
to capture the non-linearity in such datasets.
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Fig. 1: We demonstrate the Andrews curve for the NSL-KDD
dataset. We plot the legitimate and malicious observations in
green and red curves respectively.
,
In this paper, we therefore consider DL techniques using
LSTM-autoencoder to model the normal traffic data. This
helps us in proposing a robust framework for detecting attacks
in network traffic. We formulate our problem as a binary
classification problem, wherein we classify any data samples
into normal and malicious type. Unlike other ML approaches,
our proposed model can automatically learn the discriminatory
features from the network traffic data.
III. PROPOSED MODEL
This section presents the framework elements and the
system architecture to build a better IDS model.
A. Modeling the normal traffic data
In this section, we introduce our proposed architecture
for detecting network attacks. We know that DL techniques
use multiple processing layers to model the input feature
accurately. This is advantageous as compared to traditional
hand-crafted feature descriptors. Where DL techniques can
automatically extract the discriminatory features and provide
much better performance compared to classical ML models.
Our proposed approach can estimate a good representation of
the input feature space.
Figure 2 describes our proposed architecture to model the
normal network data. We use the Recurrent Neural Network
(RNN) and autoencoder architectures based on the nature of
the input data, where the temporal correlations of network
traffic often generate time-series data [25]. For this reason,
we used the RNN-based approach to solve the problem of
Fig. 2: Proposed model to encode the input features. We use
blocks of encoder and decoder comprising LSTM layers.
simple feed-forward neural networks, since RNN considers
the previous output and the current input at each stage.
In addition, RNN has been applied efficiently in many of
anomaly detection systems [26]. Training the model with such
methods can minimize the loss and further, it can provide high
performance. Additionally, the autoencoder has the advantage
in number of classification problem. The reason that we
decided to use the autoencoder in our proposed model for
anomaly detection is the fact that the autoencoder is trying
to learn the best parameters to reconstruct the input at the
output layer. Moreover, we adapted the LSTM algorithm for
our model to solve the issues of the standard RNN technique,
such as vanishing and exploding gradient problems [27].
Our model uses LSTM-autoencoder to learn the represen-
tations of the network dataset in an unsupervised fashion. Our
model contains multiple layers of encoder and decoder stages,
and each stage consists of multiple LSTM units. The input
data Xt is encoded via the encoder block to generate the
fixed range feature vector Zt. The input data Xt ∈ IR122×1 is
the initial encoded feature vector generated from the dataset.
We set timestamp = 1 for our LSTM blocks. We used
the LSTM blocks for individual events, and not for time
series. The encoder block sequentially reduces the dimension
of the 122 dimension initial feature vector. The dimensions
are reduced to 32, 16, and 8, after the first, second, and third
layers of the encoder, respectively. The final encoded feature
vector Zt ∈ IR8×1 represents the compressed input data.
The encoded data is then fed into the decoder block for
generating the output feature vector. We represent the input
feature vector of the decoder block as Ẑt. The layers in the
decoder block are arranged in the reverse order as that of the
encoder layers. The encoded features Ẑt are then fed via a
series of LSTM blocks to generate the output feature vector
X̂t. The dimensions are increased to 8, 16, and 32, after the
first, second, and third layers of the decoder, respectively.
Finally, the final layer of the decoder block is fed to a fully
connected layer to generate the output feature vector X̂t. We
attempt to reconstruct this output feature vector X̂t to be
similar to the input feature vectorXt. We use the Mean Square
Error (MSE) to calculate the estimation error between input
data Xt and output representation X̂t.
The reconstruction error for normal traffic data will be less,
as compared to that of anomalous traffic data. This behavior
will greatly help in detecting the anomalous traffic, as its
corresponding error value will be considerably higher.
B. Anomaly detection framework
We train our DL model using normal data only without
consider any anomalies traffic data. We compute the `2-
norm error between the original feature Xt and the output
feature X̂t to compute the reconstruction error. The `2-norm
error e = ‖Xt − X̂t‖2 will be low for normal traffic data,
and high for anomalous traffic data. Therefore, we use the
reconstruction error to obtain the realistic threshold for the
binary classification of normal and anomalous traffic data. The
threshold value is used as a decision boundary for detecting
anomalous data. The observations that have a reconstruction
error greater than the threshold value will be classified as
anomalous, while the samples that have reconstruction error
less than the threshold are classified as normal traffic data.
IV. EVALUATION AND RESULTS
A. Dataset
Selecting the proper datasets is very important for eval-
uating intrusion detection performance. There are different
methodologies to generate the intrusion detection datasets [28]
such as i) test-bed dataset, ii) sanitized dataset, iii) standard
dataset. However, it is difficult to generate real network
traffic from the first two methods. In addition, various attack
categories are needed to create a real dataset that can reflect
the real network traffic. To address the previous limitation, we
used NSLKDD dataset to evaluate the proposed DL model.
The NSL-KDD dataset is a new modified version of the
original datasets KDDCUP’99. It was generated typically to
remove the inherent problems in the original dataset. The
NSL-KDD dataset is now the de facto benchmark dataset for
the purpose of analysis network intrusion.
The NSL-KDD dataset is divided into training and testing
sets for the purpose of ML-Algorithms evaluation. There
are two variants of training and testing sets. The two files
KDDTrain+ and KDDTest+ indicate the full version of the
dataset with all observations. Smaller subsets of the dataset
are available and are referred to as KDDTrain– and KDDTest–
datasets. The NSL-KDD dataset contains 22 specific types of
attacks with 17 additional types in the testing set that do not
appear in the training set. Each observation in the dataset
belongs to one of the five main categories: Normal, DoS
attack, probing attacks, U2R, and R2L. In this paper, we focus
our attention on a binary classification problem, wherein we
classify each observation as normal or anomalous traffic data.
The observations belonging to DoS, probing, U2R, and R2L
are categorized as anomalous traffic data.
B. Loss trend of our proposed model
All the experiments were implemented in Python program-
ming language using various libraries such as Scikit-Learn,
Keras, and Tensorflow. We also execute all the experiments
using a workstation machine that has the following properties:
Intel(R) UHD Graphics 620, I7-8650UCPU @ 1.90GHz (8
cores), 2.1GHz, Windows 10 pro 64-bit with 16 GB of RAM.
We model the training file of NSL-KDD dataset as a fixed-
length feature vector. All input features which are numeric
in nature are normalized to the range [0, 1]. We transform
the categorical features into numerical values using one-hot
encoding. The final input feature Xt is a 122-dimension
feature vector. We use the generated feature Xt to train our
model, in this case the reconstruction loss is very low. We
conducted different experiments to get the best values of
hyper-parameters for model initiation. During these experi-
ments, we change the value of learning rate, hidden layers
size, epochs, and batch size and select the values that provide
a high accuracy rate. We use a learning rate of 0.0001, batch
size of 32, and train the model using Adam optimizer. We
use Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) as the activation function
to overcome the vanishing gradient problem.
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Fig. 3: Trend of training and validation loss over the number
of epochs.
Table I summaries the choice of different hyper-parameters.
The trend of training and validation loss over the number of
epochs is depicted in Fig. 3. We observe that the loss trend
is similar for training and validation sets, and converges after
a few hundreds of epochs.
C. Detecting different attack types
Our trained approach can model the normal traffic data with
the least reconstruction error. This serves as the measure to
identify the anomalous traffic data. We compute the distribu-
tion of the reconstruction loss for all the observations in the
training set. We pick different threshold values and select the
optimal value, which give best results for the detection rate.
Figure 4 describes the reconstruction loss based on the five
different labels.
Parameters Best Values
Hidden layers 3
Hidden layer size (neurons) 32, 16, and 8
Optimizer Adam
Loss function MSE
Activation function ReLU
Batch size 32
Learning rate 0.0001
Number of epochs 100
TABLE I: We mention the values of the several hyper-
parameters.
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Fig. 4: Distribution of the reconstruction errors for normal
traffic and various attack types traffic data. This violin plot
represents the probability density of the data smoothed by a
kernel.
We observe that the errors of the four types of anomalous
traffic data is much higher than that of the normal traffic
data. We mark this threshold in Figure 4 with a red line.
We set a threshold of 0.00368 to differentiate the normal
and anomalous traffic data. In the testing set, we use this
threshold to differentiate the normal and anomalous for each
data sample. The observations that have a reconstruction
error greater than the threshold are categorized as anomalous
traffic; whereas the observations less than the threshold are
categorized as normal traffic.
Figure 5 describes the different detection rate of the five
data classes with different threshold values. We notice that
the change in the threshold value does not cause a significant
change in DoS and Probe attacks. This is because both
DoS and Probe categories are commonly more different from
normal traffic patterns [29]. In contrast, the last two attack
classes (R2L and U2R) have high similarity to the normal
connections, and therefore, at a specific threshold, we found
unexpected decline in U2R and R2L instances. Since the
minority attacks can cause a serious risk on the system, it
is essential to identify them early before normal traffic [30].
In the testing set, we use the chosen threshold of 0.00368
to detect malicious traffic data. We illustrate the efficacy of
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Fig. 5: Detection rate of the five different traffic Types with
different threshold values.
our proposed approach by reporting the detection rate of the
five different traffic types. The detection rate is the fraction
of the detected traffic for an individual traffic type. Table II
summarizes the detection rate for the five different traffic
types. In the case of normal traffic data, the observations less
than the threshold are considered a positive detection. On the
other hand, for the other four types, the observations that have
a reconstruction error greater than the threshold are considered
a positive detection.
Table II clearly shows that the detection rate is higher for a
particular error type. This indicates that for a considered traffic
type, most of its observations are detected properly. However,
in this paper, we focus our attention on a binary classification
problem and do not delve further into classifying the various
types of attacks. The four anomalous traffic data – DoS, R2L,
U2R and probe are categorised in a single category and is
termed as attack.
Traffic Type Detection Rate (%)
Normal 88.2
DoS 92.5
R2L 100.0
U2R 100.0
Probe 99.1
TABLE II: Detection rate of the five different traffic types.
This value is obtained in the testing set of the NSL-KDD
dataset.
We also check the efficacy of our proposed method for the
classification of normal data and attack. Figure 6 illustrates
the confusion matrix that we obtain in the testing stage using
our proposed DL approach. We also show the confusion
matrices obtained from the other traditional ML approaches.
Each event in the testing set either belong to normal or attack
events. We observe that most of the benchmarking methods
have a poor detection rate for the attack traffic. Furthermore,
our proposed approach has a high degree of accuracy of
0.91 in correctly detecting the attack events in the network.
However, our accuracy is slightly lower at 0.88 for normal
traffic events. This is reasonable for all practical applications,
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Fig. 6: Confusion matrix obtained from our proposed approach, and other benchmarking methods. We observe that our proposed
approach is better in correctly identifying the attacks, as compared to the other methods.
as it is important to correctly identify all the attacks in network
traffic.
D. Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
The proposed method is dependent on the choice of the
threshold for detecting malicious traffic data. We use the ROC
curve in order to demonstrate the impact of the threshold on
the performance of our proposed approach. The ROC curve
is the plot between false positive rate and true positive rate,
for varying thresholds. Figure 7 describes the ROC curve of
our proposed method.
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Fig. 7: Receiver Operating Curve (ROC) of our proposed
approach across varying threshold values.
The area under the ROC curve, popularly known as area
Under the Curve (AUC), which is a measure of the efficacy
degree of the binary classifier. A ROC curve with a unity
AUC indicates the perfect binary classifier. We compute the
AUC value for Figure 7, and obtain the value of 0.957. This
high value indicates the good performance of our proposed
method.
E. Benchmarking
Finally, we benchmark our proposed method with other
state-of-art classification models. We used precision, recall, f-
Score, and detection rate, to evaluate our model performance.
The mathematical representation of these metrics are calcu-
lated as follows:
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
(1)
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
(2)
F-score =
2× Precision× Recall
Precision + Recall
(3)
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
(4)
where TP (True Positive) represents the number of instances
correctly classified as an attack; TN (True Negative) represents
the number of instances correctly classified as normal; FP
(False Positive) represents the number of instances incorrectly
classified as an attack; FN (False Negative) represents the
number of instances incorrectly classified as normal.
For a comprehensive evaluation of the proposed model,
we compared our model with some of the most well-used
ML algorithms, also with some of the most well-known
techniques that have employed the NSL-KDD dataset for
their evaluation. Firstly, we benchmark against classical ML
algorithms such as SVM, J48 , Naive Bayes (NB) and Random
Forest (RF). Secondly, we compare our proposed model with
the existing state of the art techniques,including [16] [17] [19].
We analyse the precision, recall, F-score, and accuracy values
for all methods. The experiments are conducted by training
the model on the full dataset KDDTrain+ and testing it on the
full dataset KDDTest+. The results are presented in Table III.
We noticed that our approach has the best performance
metrics compared to various classification techniques. The
other techniques analysed including [16] [17] [19] fail to have
competitive F-score and accuracy values.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The network data can often be compromised by malicious
attacks by intruders. Therefore, researchers usually deploy
machine learning based frameworks to detect anomalies dur-
ing cybersecurity attacks. In this paper, we highlight the
existing problems in related methods and propose solutions
to address them. We propose a deep learning approach based
on LSTM-autoencoder that can model the normal traffic data
Dataset Approach Precision (in %) Recall (in %) F-score (in %) Accuracy (in %)
KDDTrain+ and KDDTest+
SVM 80 75 75 75.3
J48 85 81 81 81.5
Naive Bayes 80 76 75 76.1
Random Forest 85 80 80 80.4
Latah et al. [16] 94 77 85 84.29
Prasath et al. [17] 77 74 75 82.99
Tang et al. [19] 83 76 75 74.67
Proposed Model 90.99 90.51 90.75 89.49
TABLE III: Benchmarking of our proposed method with other state-of-art network intrusion detection techniques. We report
the precision, recall, F-score and accuracy for the different benchmarking algorithms. We report the results by training on
KDDTrain+, and testing on KDDTest+ dataset.
efficiently. Our experiments indicate that the proposed model
can accurately detect the anomalies presented in network
traffic data. In our future work, we plan to apply our current
model on various benchmark datasets, such as CICIDS 2017,
Kyoto, UNSW-NB15, and ISC2012. We also plan to extend
the binary classification problem into a multi-class classifica-
tion problem. Such that the type of network attacks are also
identified and categorized accurately.
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